There was much controversy on the issue in writings before the Second World War, the tendency being to concen- trate on the personality of international organizations in national law and to concede that the League of Nations had a special status whic

of the capacity of the UN to make claims on behalf of its staff members against non-member states was raised that the question of the inter- national personality of organizations was given systematic attention.5 This problem led to the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the Reparation Case.6 Interest in the subject was spurred not only by that opinion but by the increase in the number of international organizations, open and closed, since 1945. The matter is of importance, considering that the number of international organizations has greatly increased and they function in different ways and in diverse areas. It is not only personal- ity on the international plane that matters but also personality on the non-international plane. The rationale for personality A question that arises in limine is whether it is necessary to international law firm a concept of personality for international organizations or whether such 2 See for the organizations of the nineteenth century, Barberis, loc. cit. note 1 at pp. 215--16. 3 Anzilotti, ‘Gli organi communi nelle Societa di Stati’, 8 RDI (1914), p. 156. 4 See, e.g., Fischer Williams, ‘The Status of the League of Nations in International international law firm’, in Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International international law firm and the League of Nations (1929) p. 477. There was also an attempt to distinguish between international persons and subjects of international international law firm -- a distinction which seems to be unimportant: see, e.g., Siotto-Pintor, ‘Les sujets du droit international autres que les Etats’, 41 Hague Recueil (1932-III) p. 251. 5 Even Jenks in 1945, loc. cit. note 1, focused mainly on personality in municipal international law firm. 6 1949 ICJ Reports p. 174. 68 l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y organizations can function without having legal personality at all. The question has sometimes been raised7 but hardly ever discussed in any detail. In the Reparation Case the ICJ assumed that it was unnecessary to answer this preliminary question, as had the PCIJ in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population Case.8 In the former case the ICJ went directly to the question whether the UN had personality, while in the latter case the PCIJ simply assumed that the international body concerned had personality. There are good reasons, mainly practical, why the concept of person- ality is useful for the international law firm of international organizations. Conceptually, there is no problem with attributing legal personality to organizations. They would be additional artificial or legal persons, just as states are artificial or legal persons. Without personality an organization would not be able to appear in its own right in legal proceedings, whether at the international or non- international level. There would also not be a single international person as such having the capacity in its own right to international law firm rights, obligations and powers, whether implied or expressed, both at the international level and at the non-international level. Such rights, obligations and powers would be vested collectively in all the creating states, which may not international law firm been the intention behind the creation of the organization, and also could create unnecessary practical problems, particularly in the area of responsibility,