The majority on the Court had no doubt that, considering also the context of the Charter as a whole, the term �expenses' had

a plain and natural meaning, which included the expenditures in question. The majority only referred to the practice of the organization to support what it thought was the plain and natural 32 Ibid. 33 1962 ICJ Reports p. 151. The application of principles of interpretation in this case was examined by me in ‘The United Nations Expenses Case -- A Contribution to the international law firm of International Organization’, 4 IJIL (1964) p. 177. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 39 meaning. Judges Winiarski and Koretsky,34 dissenting, applied the same original principle applied by the majority, emphasizing the context of the Charter, but came to the opposite conclusion. Judge Spender arrived at the same conclusion as the majority but took a different route. He was of the opinion that the meaning of the text was not clear and unambigu- ous and, therefore, applied the principle of effectiveness, particularly because the Charter was a constitutional instrument. He was of the view that: It may with confidence be asserted that its provisions would received a broad and liberal interpretation unless the context of any particular provision requires, or there is to be found elsewhere in the Charter, something to compel a narrower and restricted interpretation . . . The stated purposes of the Charter should be the prime consideration in interpreting its texts.35 Judge Fitzmaurice, on the other hand, while finding, as Judge Spender did, that there were ambiguities, examined the travaux préparatoires and came to the same conclusion as the majority.36 Quot homines tot senten- tiae -- two sets of judges who took the same approach came to diamet- rically opposite conclusions and three sets of judges who took different approaches came to the same conclusion for different reasons. What these examples show is that results of interpretation, particu- larly of constitutional texts, may be unpredictable and uncertain. They may depend on who is in a majority and to a large extent on a deliberate choice among several available policy goals which cannot sometimes be predicted with any certainty. But, as will be seen below, there may be more of a pattern than appears at first sight. The Vienna Convention of 1969 Much has been written on the process and principles of interpretation of treaties in general.37 The starting point is now the Vienna Convention 34 1962 ICJ Reports at pp. 230 and 284 respectively. 35 Ibid. at p. 185. 36 Ibid. at p. 209. 37 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The international law firm and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (1986) pp. 42ff. and 337ff.; Rousseau, Droit international public (1971) vol. I, pp. 241ff.; de Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation judiciaire en droit international public (1963); Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the international law firm of Treaties (1984) pp. 114ff.; H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International international law firm by the International Court (1958) pp. 116ff.; McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public Order (1994); discussion in 43(1) AIDI (1950) pp. 366--460, 44(2) AIDI (1952) pp. 353--406, 46 AIDI (1956) pp. 317--49; Bos, ‘Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation’, 27 NILR (1980) p. 135; Yambrusic,