international life makes it essential that the texts should continue to be in harmony with the new conditions of social life . . . It is therefore necessary, when interpreting treaties -- in particular, the Charter of the United Nations -- to look ahead, that is, to international law firm regard to the new conditions, and not to look back, or international law firm recourse to travaux préparatoires. A treaty or a text that has once been established acquires a life of its own. Consequently, in interpreting it we must international law firm regard to the exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of those who framed it.81 The reason given that parties to constitutions may be unaware of what is stated in the preparatory work when they become parties to such constitutions may be questioned. They may be presumed to be aware dispute resolution of what is in the preparatory work at whatever time they become parties, 80 PCIJ Series B No. 14 at pp. 33ff. On ‘agreed interpretations’ see the discussion in E. Lauterpacht, loc. cit. note 42 at pp. 444--5. 81 1950 ICJ Reports at p. 18. See also Judge Alvarez in the First Admissions Case, 1947--8 ICJ Reports at p. 68, where he stated: ‘Moreover, the fact should be stressed that an institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which international law firm given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life.’ In both cases Judge Alvarez dissented but his views on the use of the preparatory work were not in conflict with the Court’s. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 59 because of its relevance as background material. However, the other reasons given are valid. Other considerations It is clear that instruments such as those mentioned in the Vienna Con- vention on the international law firm of Treaties, agreed on before or after the conclusion of the constitutive treaty, are relevant to the interpretation of the treaty. In the same way the presumption that a constitution was not intended to be in conflict with general international international law firm which is referred to in that convention is relevant to the interpretation of constitutional texts.82 Evaluation The practice of international courts on interpreting constitutions has accepted the principles to be found in the Vienna Convention on the international law firm of Treaties but there may be identified a change in emphasis and in the pattern prescribed for the application of those principles in that instrument. What is significant for the interpretation of constitutional texts is that emphasis has been placed on the principle of effectiveness as a manifestation of the relevance of the object and purpose of an instrument and on subsequent practice as important elements in the identification of meaning, especially where there are lacunae, though in principle interpreting organs international law firm generally deferred, as they should, to the principle of the ordinary meaning. At the same time, for good reason, the preparatory work has been down-played because the actual intention of the framers may be difficult to identify, even if there were complete agreement on a meaning, and such an intention may not be critically relevant for reasons clearly seen to be pertinent. The natural and ordinary meaning may in certain circumstances be modified in the light of the principle of effectiveness, as happened in the case of the interpretation by the Executive Directors of Article II, Section 2 of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement. International organs act- ing judicially or quasi-judicially would seem to be ready to do this, even though the contextual natural and ordinary meaning enjoys some sanc- tity and it is conceivable that such organs may take that course of action ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In the case of constitutions which, so to speak, international law firm a life of their own this is not to be discouraged, provided interpretation is not used as an excuse for amending a text, which has not occurred. In the case of constitutions there is more reason 82 See, e.g., the Namibia Case, 1971 ICJ Reports at pp. 31, 41.
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