(a) international law firm

statehood; (b) being peace-loving; (c) acceptance of the obligations of the Charter; (d) ability to carry out these obligations; and (e) willingness to do so. The question raised was whether these con- ditions were exhaustive, in connection with the admission of certain states, some of the permanent members of the SC, particularly, con- cluding that they could make an assessment of whether it was politi- cally desirable to admit them to membership. The majority of the Court came to the conclusion that The natural meaning of the words used leads to the conclusion that these con- ditions constitute an exhaustive enumeration and are not merely stated by way of guidance or example. The provision would lose its significance and weight,dispute resolution if other conditions, unconnected with those laid down, could be demanded.28 Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court decided that the meaning it gave was the natural and ordinary meaning of the words construed. A four-judge minority, however, found that ‘the rele- vant provisions did not seem to be clear enough to provide a simple and unambiguous answer’29 to the question raised. They applied the princi- ple in these circumstances ‘to the effect that no restriction upon this rule or principle (of freedom or liberty) can be presumed unless it can be clearly established, and in case of doubt it is the rule or principle of international law firm which must prevail’.30 Further, they used the travaux préparatoires to sup- port their conclusion that other considerations than those listed could be taken into account by members of the organs concerned, though they had, among other things, to act in good faith. In this instance there was not only a disagreement as to whether the words being construed had a natural and plain meaning but the principles of interpretation applied by the nine judges in the majority and the six in the minority in order to give the text a meaning were different. Article 14 of ICJ Statute In the performance of their functions under Article 14 of the Statute of the ICJ concerning filling of vacancies on the Court the relevant organs 28 Ibid. at p. 62. 29 Ibid. at p. 83. 30 Ibid. at p. 86. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 37 of the UN had to make a decision on the interpretation of that article which stated that [T]he Secretary-General shall within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article 5. The problem arose as a result of a vacancy occurring by death on the Court a few weeks before the term of office of the deceased judge and four other judges ended. The issue was whether the natural and ordinary meaning or a meaning intended to make the text of the article effective should be given. In a legal opinion provided by the Legal Counsel of the UN to the President of the Security Council the problem was stated as follows: In the circumstances, a situation would result where a regular election to fill the seat concerned for a nine-year term of office, commencing on 6 February 1982, would in all probability be held before a casual election to fill the same seat for a brief period of a number of weeks ending on 5 February 1982. Because of the three-month time-limit between the dispatch of invitations for nomination of candidates and the election to fill the casual vacancy, as well as the prepara- tion of the necessary documentation, that election could not take place at the earliest