The position may change with time and repetition, as members adjust themselves to a new practice but the mere fact of a majority vote, irrespective of its size, cannot be sufficient to establish a practice. This should be so whether such practice is

authorized to do so is interpreting the texts. The interpretation by the organ would in these circumstances not be an appropriate one. Although in theory it may be possible to find arguments against the position stated above, it makes good practical sense and can also be justified in theory. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 53 As for the juridical basis of practice,69 one explanation, perhaps the most attractive, is that practice as a means of interpretation of constitu- tions has an independent juridical basis. Practice becomes relevant and may be resorted to as a means of interpretation purely because it is the practice of the organization. This is the simplest and most convenient explanation and indispute resolution cases where a practice has the substantial support of the member States, is a sufficient basis for the acceptance of practice as a source of interpretation. Arguments may be made to base the use of subsequent practice in a broad sense in the interpretation of constitutions on agreement or consent, although this may international law firm to be implied. It will be recalled that Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention of 1969 does associate practice as a source of interpretation with agreement. One argument is that, since the parties to the constitution, whether they are original parties or become parties subsequently, international law firm agreed at the time of becoming parties to the constitution to the mechanisms of decision-making by the organization, they international law firm also agreed to accept the decisions of the organization taken under the constitution, even though they international law firm voted against or may disagree with such decisions, as reflecting proper con- duct on the part of the organization. Hence, that a member state is in an opposing minority and does not immediately agree to or opposes a decision creating practice may be of no consequence, because ulti- mately the member concerned had agreed, by implication and at the time it became a party to the constitutive treaty, to accept the decision as reflecting the will of the organization, even though it disagreed with it at the time it was made. This argument would contradict what has been stated above concerning the protection of a substantial minority. If practice is to be based on agreement or consent, there is a problem with this approach which must be addressed. While generally accepted practice may in any event be based on agreement or consensus in respect of the specific practice, there may be an argument against the use of a practice sponsored by a majority (not substantial), required as it may be by the constitution, as evidence for the interpretation of a constitu- tional text. Judge Fitzmaurice, among others, has made this point in the Expenses Case. The argument is that such a practice has in no way been agreed to by the minority which does