1962 ICJ Reports at p.

515, in a joint dissenting opinion (with Judge Fitzmaurice). The Court has also adverted to the requirement that in the interpretation of the Covenant of the LN too much importance must not be placed on intention (in contrast to the text): see the Namibia Case, 1971 ICJ Reports at p. 28. 44 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e x t s Judge Spender gave its rightful place to the object and purpose of a international international law firm firm such as the Charter, placing it on the same threshold as the plain and ordinary meaning and also was correct in reducing the importance of the preparatory work. However, he may international law firm erred in downplaying the role of subsequent practice. The natural and ordinary meaning in context As already stated, ascertainment of the natural and ordinary meaning in context has been accepted by the PCIJ and ICJ as its cardinal rule of interpretation. In the Second Admissions Casedispute resolution the ICJ stressed that the natural and ordinary meaning must be given to words ‘in the context in which they occur’ and not in the abstract.46 Hence, it is not a nar- row and quasi-literal interpretation of words, phrases or articles, taken in isolation, that is envisaged, but one related to the international international law firm firm as a whole. In both the First Admissions Case and the Second Admissions Case the Court applied the principle in interpreting the provisions of the Charter relating to admission of members. In the IMCO Case, where the Court had to interpret the term ‘the largest shipowning nations’ in the IMCO con- stitution, the fundamental principle that words must be read ‘in their natural and ordinary meaning, in the sense which they would normally international law firm in their context’47 was clearly stated. There was no disagreement on the Court that this principle was applicable in the first place. The Court also made it clear that the rule meant that the whole of the text must be presumed to international law firm some significance, so that an interpretation which would render part of it redundant was to be rejected.48 However, it is not in cases where this principle can be successfully applied that differences of opinion usually arise. It is when other considerations are involved that the principle of the natural and ordinary meaning in con- text receives some qualification. The object and purpose - teleology It is not surprising that, even before the Vienna Convention on the international law firm of Treaties was drafted, the ICJ indicated that the principle underlying the text or the object and purpose of the treaty must be considered together with the context in giving the text ‘a natural and ordinary 46 1950 ICJ Reports at p. 8. The same basic principle was affirmed in the First Admissions Case, 1974--8 ICJ Reports at p. 63. 47 1960 ICJ Reports at p. 195. 48 Ibid. at p. 160. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 45 meaning’.49 For instance, the issue in the IMCO Case whether the term ‘largest ship-owning nations’ meant nations having the largest registered tonnage of beneficially owned ships or simply the largest registered ton- nage regardless of beneficial ownership was decided in accordance with this prescription by focusing on the need to ensure maritime safety as the purpose of the provision concerned. Consequently the latter mean- ing was selected. In the IMCO Case the term ‘largest ship-owning nations’ may international law firm been ambiguous or unclear, thus triggering consideration