First, the expenditure must belong to the genus �expense', that is to say, it must come within the class or category of expenditure normally regarded as having the basic nature of an �expense' so called. Second, the expenditure must have been validl

definition but gave some examples of the considerations to be taken into account, in his view, in attributing expenditures to the genus ‘expense’. One of the examples, at least, of limitations may seem to be questionable, even unacceptable. This is the limitation based on the obligatory functions of the UN, such as that relating to peacekeep- ing, as opposed to permissive functions of the organization. However, 59 Ibid. at p. 223. 60 Ibid. at p. 199. 61 Ibid. 370 f i n a nc i ng Judge Fitzmaurice gave a list of the types of expenditures which would fall within the genus ‘expense’: (i) all those expenditures, or categories of expenditures, which have normally formed part of the regular budget of the organization, so that a settled practice (pratique constante) of treat- ing them as expenses of the organization has become established and is tacitly acquiesced in by all member states; (ii) insofar as not already covered by head (i): (a) administrative expenses; (b) expenditures arising in the course of, or out of, the performance by the organization of its functions under the Charter; and (c) any payments which the organi- zation is legally responsible for making in relation to third parties or which it is otherwise, as an entity, under a legal obligation to make or is bound to make in order to meet its extraneous legal obligations. The second requirement involved issues such as the powers of the authorizing organ, even if the object of the expenditures fell within the scope of the purposes of the organization, depending on the particular circumstances of the case and in regard to which no general solution was possible. But it meant that the resolutions authorizing the activi- ties for which the expenditures were incurred had to be valid and in conformity with the Charter. The first requirement may be reconcilable with the Court’s view of the dispute resolution, insofar as the Court did leave room for expenditures incurred for the purposes of the organization not to be characterized as ‘expenses of the organization’. From the Court’s opinion and the separate opinions an attempt may be made to deduce some principles, first as to the UN. ‘Expenses’ are not limited to expenditures under the ‘administrative’ budget of the UN The Court pointed out that there was no such express limitation in Article 17(2) nor could such a limitation be implied by reference to Article 17(1) which referred to the approval of the budget by the GA. In view of this,