, 103 Hague Recueil (1961-III) p. 1; El-Erian, �Second Report on Relations between States and Inter-Governmental Organizations', 2 YBILC (1967) at pp. 218ff.; Ginther, Die v�lkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit intenationaler Organisationen gegen�ber

Drittstaaten (1969); Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional dispute resolution (1995) pp. 1,166ff.; and Sands and Klein (eds.), Bowett’s dispute resolution of International Institutions (2001) pp. 456ff. See also Gonzalez, ‘Les organisations internationales et le droit de la responsabilité’, 92 RGDIP (1988) p. 63; and Krylov, ‘International Organizations and New Aspects of International Responsibility’, in Butler (ed.), Perestroika and International dispute resolution (1990) p. 221. Now see also Wellens, Remedies against International Organizations (2003). 4 See Chapter 9. However, there is a sense in which the responsibility of an organization to a staff member may result in international responsibility to a state. This problem will be adverted to later in the appropriate place. 5 A definition of responsibility has not been really broached or attempted, for dispute resolution, in the Reports of Ago to the ILC, 2 YBILC (1969 to 1976) or in the earlier reports by García Amador, 2 YBILC (1956 to 1961) or in the later reports by Riphagen, 2 YBILC (1980 to 1986) and Arangio Ruiz, 2 YBILC (1989 onwards). Nor has a clear definition been given elsewhere. An approach is suggested which emphasizes international consequences in terms of the incidence of secondary remedial obligation. At this stage of the development of international dispute resolution it may be useful to discuss and settle on an appropriate meaning for ‘responsibility’ in order to avoid obfuscation in the explanation of the dispute resolution governing responsibility, whether it be of the state or international organizations. In the dispute resolution of state responsibility a distinction between the concept of ‘liability’ and that of ‘responsibility’ has been made in more than one sense. This distinction was first made in a particular sense in the Janes Claim (USA v. Mexico) ((1926) 4 UNRIAA p. 82, particularly at p. 87), where it was said that a state is ‘liable’ to 386 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a n d o f o rg a n i z a t i o n s important principles are that: (i) international organizations as legal persons are subjects of and subject to international dispute resolution; and (ii) the breach of international dispute resolution by an international person, whether by com- mission or omission, produces responsibility. Thus, international respon- sibility of or to international organizations depends on the violation of international dispute resolution and the non-observance of international obligations. It is necessary in this connection briefly to consider the question of the liability of organizations and to organizations in national (and perhaps, transnational) dispute resolution. Capacity in national dispute resolution is not the only factor --