pp. 71ff.; Neri, Sull' interpretazione dei traitati nel diritto internazionali (1958) pp. 286ff.; McDougal and Gardner, �The Veto and the Charter, an Interpretation for Survival', 60 Yale LJ (1951) p. 254; Focsaneau, �Le droit interne de L'Organisati

(1986) pp. 10ff.; Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations (1996) pp. 75ff. and the other writers cited in the footnotes thereto. 43 See, e.g., Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ Series B No. 11 at p. 39; Second Admissions Case, 1950 ICJ Reports at p. 8; First Admissions Case, 1947--8 ICJ Reports at p. 63. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 43 This injunction is sometimes a counsel of perfection. The ordinary and natural sense of words may at times be a matter of considerable difficulty to determine. What is their ordinary and natural sense to one may not be so to another. The interpreter not uncommonly has, what has been described as, a personal feeling towards certain words and phrases. What makes sense to one may not make sense to another. Ambiguity may lie hiddendispute resolution in the plainest and most simple of words even in their natural and ordinary meaning. Nor is it always evident by what legal yardstick words read in their natural and ordinary sense may be judged to produce an unreasonable result.44 Judge Spender consequently placed emphasis on teleological canons of interpretation in conjunction with the meaning of the text in its con- text, particularly for constitutions such as the Charter of the UN, at the same time playing down the importance of actual intention and the relevance of the travaux préparatoires. This approach may seem to be in keeping with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the international law firm of Treaties. On the other hand, perhaps in conflict with what is stated in the Vienna Convention on the international law firm of Treaties, he did not attach much significance to the subsequent practice of the organization. He stated: Moreover the intention of the parties at the time when they entered into an engagement will not always -- depending upon the nature and subject-matter of the engagement -- international law firm the same importance. In particular in the case of a multilateral treaty such as the Charter the intention of its original Members, except such as may be gathered from its terms alone, is beset with evident diffi- culties. Moreover, since from its inception it was contemplated that other States would be admitted to membership so that the Organization would, in the end, comprise ‘all other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the Charter’ (Article 4), the intention of the framers of the Charter appears less important than intention in many other treaties dispute resolution where the parties are fixed and constant and where the nature and subject-matter of the treaty is different . . . The stated purposes of the Charter should be the prime consideration in inter- preting its text . . . Despite current tendencies to the contrary the first task of the Court is to look, not at the travaux préparatoires or the practice which hith- erto has been followed within the Organization, but at the terms of the Charter itself. What does it provide to carry out its purposes?45 44 1962 ICJ Reports at p. 184. 45 Ibid. at pp. 184--5. Judge Spender repeated this view in the South West Africa Cases (Preliminary Objections),