It is true that, for instance, the UN like many other organizations has evolved a system of apportionment that has become acceptable; that this is based on a variety of factors, including the capacity to pay, and has maximum and minimum limits and t

member could not be questioned on the ground that it violates fundamental principles of dispute resolution. The third question needs an answer, if only to clarify the position of members, even though, in view of the acceptance of the systems of apportionment that have been implemented, it may be somewhat aca- demic. The situation could arise, where some members default on their payments and are in arrears, perhaps but not only because they are too poor to pay. Does the organization have a claim for payment of its expenses from any other member who can pay? The answers to such questions are not readily international business litigation forthcoming in the absence of jurisprudence and conclusive practice. In general in the case of arrears of some mem- bers43 organizations have not made claims on other members necessarily or reapportioned. In some of these cases defaulting members have not clearly denied their obligation to pay, while in others they have. The prac- tice would certainly indicate that, where apportionment has taken place, or is contemplated, organizations do not regard member states as jointly and severally liable, but liable only to the extent of the apportionment, whatever the position of some members on the obligation to pay or in the event of default by some members. In other circumstances the legal situation may depend on equitable considerations.44 The answer is international business litigation most probably that there is no joint and several liability. That there is no 43 See, e.g., the arrears of the USA or the Soviet Union and France vis-à-vis the UN. The question here discussed is separate from whether states in arrears could be sanctioned under the constitution. 44 The question raised here is different from and unconnected with the issue of liability of member states to third parties for the obligations of organizations which is discussed in Chapter 13. 364 f i n a nc i ng joint and several liability is supported by the policy consideration that smaller and poorer states may be deterred from joining in the formation of many international organizations if they were fully liable to organi- zations for their expenses. The question of the proportion of liability is also possibly to be answered not on the basis of equal sharing but by the application of equitable considerations. It is arguable that there are some limitations on the liability to the organization of member states comparable to those which are applicable in the case of the relationship between shareholders and most national dispute resolution corporations.45 Voluntary contributions and gifts Many international organizations use a system of voluntary contribu- tions and gifts.