the expenditures would only be �expenses of the organization' if he had acted within the scope of his apparent authority.56 Judge Spender's view of the principles involved admitted

of a special exception. Where the SG took action under a resolution which was in accord with the purposes of the organization, if he had acted outside the scope of his appar- ent authority, the resulting expenditure could not be regarded as an ‘expense of the organization’ for the purposes of Article 17(2). It was also said to be necessary that the GA should decide that the expendi- tures in question were ‘expenses of the organization’. Judge Morelli, in his separate opinion, propounded an equally broad test for determining the ‘expenses of the organization’ under Arti- cle 17(2). According to him any expenditure which was validly autho- rized by the GA under Article 17(1) as part of the budget was to be regarded as an ‘expense of the organization’ under Article 17(2), irre- spective of the validity of the resolutions under which the expenses were incurred;57 these expenses had to be actually authorized by the GA under Article 17(1), it being insufficient that they could possibly be so autho- rized by the GA,58 and the circumstances in which an authorization 56 1962 ICJ Reports at p. 183. 57 Ibid. at p. 224. 58 Ibid. at p. 220. e x p e n s e s 369 would become invalid were extremely limited and that was when there was some essential defect.59 Validity could only be defeated by an essen- tial defect. The exact scope of ‘essential defect’ is not clearly stated. It will be recalled that the Court also left room for situations where the expenditure might not be covered by Article 17(2) both where the basic resolutions themselves were valid and where they were invalid accord- ing to the provisions of the Charter but within the purposes of the organization. Judge Fitzmaurice recognized in his separate opinion that the opin- ion of the Court was in fact founded on the idea that Article 17(2) can- not be confined to administrative expenses, that at least those expenses incurred in the discharge of the essential functions of the UN such as its peacekeeping activities were covered by Article 17(2), that such activities as were undertaken by the GA in this field in connection with the UNEF and the ONUC operations were expressly provided for in the Charter and were in keeping with the conditions and limitations of the Charter and that, therefore, expenditures incurred under them were ‘expenses of the organization’ for the purposes of Article 17(2).60 On the other hand, he thought that the Court’s view that, even if the GA in carrying out its activities had not been acting in conformity with the division of func- tions established by the Charter, the resulting expenditures would still be ‘expenses of the organization’ for the purposes of Article 17(2), pro- vided that they related to activities coming within the functions of the organization as a whole, should not be pressed too far.61 According to Judge Fitzmaurice, in order that an expenditure may be characterized as ‘expenses of the organization’ under Article 17(2), two conditions had generally to be satisfied.