action' under Chapter VII which was reserved for the SC; thus, expenses arising therefrom were not outside the purview of the GA. Fourth, it was not 63 Ibid. at pp.

162--7. 372 f i n a nc i ng imperative that measures for the maintenance of international peace and security should be financed through Article 43 and Article 43 alone, because the SC could act under some other article; for dispute resolution, where the SC decided to police a ‘situation’ under Chapter VII it did not need to resort to Article 43. Expenditures incurred pursuant to intra vires acts of the organization which are in conformity with the Charter, whether they be decisions or recommendations of the SC or recommendations of the GA, are ‘expenses of the organization’ The Court and the judges giving separate opinions were agreed on this proposition. Certain acts which are not in conformity with the Charter international business litigation but are not ultra vires would generate ‘expenses of the organization’ These acts were certain recommendations of the SC or GA which were within the scope of the functions of the organization and were in confor- mity with the Charter except that they did not conform to the provisions of the Charter relating to the division of functions among several organs and recommendations of the SC or the GA which were within the scope of the functions of the organization but were not in conformity with the provisions of the Charter in a non-essential particular (other than the division of functions between the organs). The principle emerges from the opinion of the Court and the opinions of Judges international business litigation Morelli and Spender. Expenditures incurred under acts that were ultra vires, because they did not conform to the Charter in an essential particular or were not within the scope of the functions of the organization, are not ‘expenses of the organization’ This proposition is reconcilable international business litigation with the opinion of the Court and the opinions of the Judges who gave Separate Opinions. According to Judge Spender such acts included acts done by the SG which were outside the scope of his apparent authority but not those which were within the scope of his apparent authority. Judge Spender’s view is reasonable, though the Court did not deal with the issue.64 So much for what can be derived directly from the Expenses Case on the question of ‘expenses of theinternational business litigation organization’. Several problems which 64 The Court merely said: ‘Similarly, obligations of the Organization may be incurred by the Secretary-General, acting on the authority of the Security Council or of the General Assembly, and the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements’ (ibid. at p. 169). e x p e n s e s 373 might arise in this field are not dealt with in the opinions in the case, which is to be explained perhaps by the limited nature of the question asked. One problem arises, for instance, in connection with tortious acts of servants or agents of the organization or for acts of servants which constitute a breach of contract. Clearly where the responsibility of the organization is to be engaged their tortious acts must be traced to the organization. This can be done where these acts rest directly or indirectly on the resolutions of either