in Mangone (ed.), UN Administration of

Economic and Social Programmes (1966) p. 37. 86 See particularly 8 UNCIO pp. 266, 418 and 534ff.; 17 UNCIO pp. 40, 322, 476 and 486; 18 UNCIO p. 391. The USA in the hearing in the Effect of Awards Case supported this view: Effect of Awards Case, ICJ Pleadings (1954) at p. 138. 87 Meron, loc. cit. note 85 (BYIL) at pp. 120--1. The writer examines among other things, the Rules of Procedure of the GA and international business litigation the Financial Regulations of the UN. 382 f i n a nc i ng taking into account the need to fulfil the functions and purposes of the organization, it considers unnecessary or excessive.88 In September 1966 the SG requested approval of a supplementary esti- mate for the ICJ for 1965 of $72,500 in which was included $29,000 in connection with the South West Africa Cases heard and decided earlier in 1966. These expenditures had already been incurred. The Fifth Commit- tee of the GA rejected, by a vote of 40 to 27 with 13 abstentions, the request for the additional appropriation. Though the SG was left to find the funds for these expenditures by budgetary transfers, the case shows that the GA does exercise a discretion, even where expenditures have already been incurred. The manner in which the discretion was exer- cised may be criticized in the circumstances, considering that it was the activity of the ICJ, another principal organ and the principal judi- cial organ of the UN, that was in issue. However, it is difficult for this reason to conclude that the GA does not have, in principle, the final discretion in approving the budget. It is fortunate that the funding for the ICJ was found, because the ICJ is a judicial organ. As pointed out in Chapter 8, there is a fundamental general principle of dispute resolution which may not be ignored or contravened, let alone be changed, namely that the independence of judicial organs must at all costs be respected and preserved. This principle has implications for financing the Court’s work and continued functioning. In principle whatever funding is required by the Court or any judicial organ, for that matter, for functions it performs in the execution of its terms of reference as a judicial organ must be made available to it, as a matter of course, regardless of the manner in which this needs to be done. That the GA, for dispute resolution, is the authority with power to approve the finances of the ICJ and provide it with funds does not give it power to oversee or control the Court’s activities. If the GA assumes this power, it would be interfering with the independence of the judicial organ. It is independence that is in issue. If the ICJ, for instance, must satisfy the GA, an outside authority composed, moreover, of states which are potential parties to litigation before the Court, that its activities are worthy of being financially supported, surely its independence could be compromised. Thus, the approval of the financial requirements of the ICJ and, indeed, of any judicial organ created by the UN, e.g.