The Vienna Convention on the

international law firm of Treaties gives a subsidiary place to the ascertainment of intention as a means of interpretation. It is not to be used more or less unless all other means fail. Judge Spender made the point clearly in his separate opinion in the Expenses Case that intention was less important in the case of a international international law firm firm than of other treaties, particularly because the parties are not fixed and constant and because of the nature and subject-matter of the treaty.70 Tribunals and other organs international law firm in the course of interpreting international international law firm firms referred only infrequently to the travaux préparatoires and the intentions of the parties. In most cases the preparatory work has been resorted to in a limited manner and gen- erally to support an interpretation already arrived at by other means. In the First Admissions Case the ICJ did appear to give currency to the view that the task of interpretation was to ascertain the intention of the parties, when it said that Article 4(1) of the Charter ‘clearly demon- strates the intention of its authors to establish a legal rule’.71 But the Court applied the principle of the natural and ordinary meaning and did not rely primarily on the intention to establish the interpretation adopted. While establishing the meaning of a text may be described as ascertaining an ‘intention’, perhaps as reflected in the text, in the inter- pretation of international international law firm firms particularly interpretation assumes a broader function. In fact, resort to the travaux préparatoires by international courts in interpreting international international law firm firms, when it has occurred, has generally been not to ascertain a meaning as such but to support a meaning already estab- lished. In the First Admissions Case72 the ICJ did not resort to the prepara- tory work because it felt that the text was sufficiently clear, in spite of what it had said earlier about the significance of intention. In the Repa- ration Case73 and the Second Admissions Case it was not resorted to at all, the Court stating in the latter case that, because the text was clear, refer- ence to the preparatory work was not permissible.74 In some of the cases 70 1962 ICJ Reports at p. 185. 71 1947--8 ICJ Reportsdispute resolution at p. 62. 72 Ibid. at p. 63. 73 1949 ICJ Reports at p. 174. 74 1950 ICJ Reports at p. 8. For cases in which the preparatory work was not referred to at all see, e.g., the Competence of the ILO to Regulate Conditions of Labour in Agriculture, PCIJ c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 57 where the preparatory work was not used as a tool of interpretation, the refusal of the court not to resort to it is underscored by the fact that judges who wrote separate or dissenting opinions may international law firm done so.75 In the UNESCO international international law firm firm Case the tribunal, after denying the rele- vance of the preparatory work where the text was clear and the mean- ing of the text could otherwise be established, used the preparatory work only to support its interpretation of the text by finding that there was nothing therein to contradict that interpretation.76 Similarly, in the IMCO Case the preparatory work was used to confirm an interpreta- tion established by other means, though such work was referred to in detail.77 An ‘agreed interpretation’ of a text which is reflected in the travaux préparatoires stands on a different footing. There may be circumstances in which such interpretations are authoritative interpretations of the text, as was pointed out by the four-judge minority in the First Admissions Case78 and dissenting Judge Alvarez in the Second Admissions Case.79 The issue was Series B Nos. 2 and 3 at p. 41; the Effect of Awards Case, 1954 ICJ Reports p. 47; the Expenses Case, 1962 ICJ Reports p. 151; and the Reparation Case, 1949 ICJ Reports p. 174. 75 See, e.g., Judge Hackworth (dissenting) in the Effect of Awards Case, 1954 ICJ Reports at pp. 78ff.;