even though the text is not ambiguous. This subject is discussed in Chapter 14 as concerned with amendment. Where a text is ambiguous, subsequent practice could help to establish one of the several meanings all of which may be described as ordinary.

unreasonable result. On the other hand, where a text is silent and subsequent practice is used to fill in lacunae, the text is virtually altered when such practice is invoked in interpretation, but this seems to be a permissible use of practice. In most of the decided cases subsequent practice has been resorted to in order to support a meaning already selected for other reasons. In manner after the interpretation adopted had been arrived at for different reasons. See also the legal opinion given to the UN Secretariat on the interpretation of Article 19 of the Charter by the Legal Counsel of the UN where the statement was made after a teleological interpretation had already been given of the article that in case of doubt the provisions of the Charter ‘should be interpreted so as to be as little burdensome’ to the member states as possible: 1983 UNJY at p. 169. 60 See, e.g., the Reparation Case; and the Effect of Awards Case. In both these cases the Court implicitly disagreed with Judge Hackworth who dissented on this ground: 1949 ICJ dispute resolution Reports at p. 198 and 1954 ICJ Reports at p. 80. 61 See by implication the Effect of Awards Case, 1954 ICJ Reports p. 47; the Expenses Case, 1962 ICJ Reports p. 151; and the Namibia Case, 1971 ICJ Reports p. 16. In the former case Judge Hackworth, dissenting, stated that the maxim should apply in order to limit the powers of the GA of the UN, whereas the Court decided that such powers were not limited in the way indicated by Judge Hackworth. 62 See the First Admissions Case 1947--8 ICJ Reports at pp. 57, 62--3; the IMCO Case, 1960 ICJ Reports at p. 150. 50 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e x t s this situation the practice is of probative value. In the Second Admissions Case it was said that the organs responsible under the Charter for the admission of members ‘international law firm consistently interpreted the text in the sense that the General Assembly can decide to admit only on the basis of a recommendation of the Security Council’.63 The evidence of practice of the GA and the SC was used to support an interpretation already adopted for other reasons. However, in an opinion of the ICJ in the Namibia Case the Court used the practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly directly to give meaning to provisions of the Charter, where, it would appear, there were gaps in the language. Abstention by a permanent member of the SC was held not to constitute a bar to the adoption of resolu- tions under Article 27(3) of the Charter.