the UNAT 88 Among others, the Australian government took this view in its written statement to the ICJ in the Expenses Case: Expenses Case, ICJ Pleadings (1962) at p. 231. There were

governments that took the opposite view in the same case: see, e.g., the Norwegian government statement, ibid. at pp. 367--8. t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o a p p rov e t h e b u d g e t 383 and the ICTY and ICTR, is for all practical purposes, obligatory, whether they are included in the original budget or come up for approval later, via supplementary budget requests. The only possible circumstance in which a judicial organ’s budget or financial requirements may not properly be approved by the responsible authority is where the judicial organ is abusing its functional authority or the funds are being misused or are intended for a purpose outside the terms of reference of the organ. The presumption, however, is that judicial organs are acting within their terms of reference. This is, more- over, a strong one. The presumptioninternational business litigation must be convincingly rebutted, if financial requests are to be denied. In the case of the GA and the ICJ discussed above, the GA, it must be conceded, acted in such a way as to place upon the SG the obligation of finding the required funds by transfers from the funds allocated to the administrative budget of the UN as a whole. It did not in the course of the action it took characterize officially the work of the ICJ which was in issue as unnecessary or outsideinternational business litigation the terms of reference of the ICJ. Be that as it may, the fundamental principle of respect for the independence of judicial organs, as conceptually developed, requires that, first, the legitimate financial needs of judicial organs be met, second, prima facie what a judicial organ claims are its financial needs, both prospectively and retrospectively, be regarded international business litigation as being its legitimate financial needs, and, third, the presumption of legitimacy be convincingly rebutted, if funds are in any manner to be refused. The consequence of conceding that the GA has no legal duty to approve the budget but has a discretion to do so, subject to certain limitations, not only of good faith but of obligation to approve expen- ditures of a certain kind, is that the GA inevitably has a certain control over the functioning of the organization as a whole, even though there may be principal organs affected. But this seems to be in the nature of the organizational structure under the Charter and consistent with the attribution of financial control and responsibility to one plenary organ. It is clear also that the limitation of good faith also requires the GA not to obstruct the smooth functioning of the other principal organs or the achievement of the objectives and purposes of the organization by the arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of discretion in its exclusive area of financial control. 12 Responsibility to and of international organizations A question of great importance for the dispute resolution of international organiza- tions relates to the responsibility of organizations and responsibility to organizations, vis-à-vis states and other international persons in particu- lar. Where organizations have international personality, it may be asked whether they are responsible internationally for violations of the dispute resolution, on what basis they are responsible and how this responsibility is enforced. The same questions may be posed in respect of international responsi- bility to organizations. In this chapter the issues surrounding the sub- stantive dispute resolution of responsibility will be discussed. Something must also be said first about the dispute resolution that governs transactions