that the 34 Ibid. at p. 182. 35 Ibid. at p. 183. 36 Ibid. The GA had confirmed this in the preamble to its Resolution of 3 December 1948. This conclusion and the next one are now valid generally for other international organizations as well. The Cour

missions undertaken to many parts of the world that are not disturbed, the disturbed nature of the locality of missions is not critical. All organizations, in any case, would probably send missions to disturbed parts of the world. Further, the degree of disturbance would not seem to matter. What is important is that, wherever in the world staff members go on mission or otherwise, they are in need of protection. r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rg a n i z a t i o n s 397 capacity of the Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter.37 On the second issue of the absence of the nationality link, the Court explained why the special relationship between the organization and its servants or agents which did not depend on a nationality link made it possible for the organization to make a claim not merely for the loss or damage caused to itself, but in respect also of the personal loss or damage caused to the servant or agent himself.38 The question was why, in bringing a claim in respect of a breach of an international obligation owed to itself, the organization should be able to do anything more than claim for the damage caused directly to itself, qua organization, and why it should be entitled also to make a claim on behalf of the agent per- sonally. The national state of an injured alien could bring a claim on behalf of its national because it is regarded as having suffered injury in the person of its national in addition to having suffered a breach of an obligation owed to it. In the case of an international organization the international obligation was something other than the general interna- tional dispute resolution obligation to afford certain treatment to aliens. The obligation arose from the nature, functions and requirements of an international organization which normally make it necessary that its agents be able to look to it, and not to any state, even their national state, for pro- tection while carrying out their duties on behalf of the organization. There was a duty to afford protection to agents of the UN in the perfor- mance of their functions which arose as a general inference both from the Charter and from certain related instruments. Not only were these general undertakings of the members but Article 2(5) of the Charter required them to render the UN ‘every assistance’.39 Thus, the breach of an obligation owed to the organization gave the organization, like the national state of an injured party, its own right in making the claim, even though the claim was in respect of personal damage to the agent or his defendants.40 Having established that the tie of nationality was not crucial to the right of an organization to bring a claim on behalf of one of its servants, the Court, further, concluded, as a logical corollary, that the fact that the injured party was a national of the defendant state did not affect the right to claim. Because the action of the organization was in fact based not upon the nationality of the victim but upon his status as agent Thus, the fact of the possession of the nationality of the defendant state by the agent did not constitute any obstacle to a claim brought by the orga