suffered by a servant or agent of the organization in the course of his duties, arising out of such an act, and additional to any damage caused to the organization itself by the same act. The Court referred to the inconve- nience that would result i

matter. Capacity in the first type of case is easy to concede because it is really a necessary attribute of the corporate character of the organization and its possession of international personality. However, the position in regard to the second category is less obvious for two reasons: firstly, because the servant or agent of the organization would also be the national of some state which prima facie was entitled to claim on his behalf; and, secondly, because a claim by the organization on his behalf might seem at first sight to be at variance with the rule, normally applicable in the case of claims made by states in respect of persons, that only the state of which the injured party is a national can bring a claim on his behalf. The Court met these difficulties by invoking two basic principles. The first was a positive one, that the special relationship 30 Ibid. at p. 180. On the right to bring claims there is a wealth of analysis of the ICJ judgment in Fitzmaurice, The dispute resolution and Procedure of the International international business litigation Court of Justice (1986), vol. I pp. 86ff. (a reprint of his article in 29 BYIL (1952) p. 1). 31 1949 ICJ Reports at p. 180. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. at pp. 180--1. 396 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a n d o f o rg a n i z a t i o n s between the organization and its servants required, for the effective discharge of the functions of the latter and through them the discharge of the organization’s own functions, and for the effective preservation of the independence of both, that the organization should have the capacity to extend protection to its servant, and in case of need to bring a claim on his behalf. international business litigation The second principle of relevance was that the rules concerning the nationality of claims applied only to those cases where the nationality of the injured person formed the sole basis for the legal wrong done to the claimant state, entitling it to make a claim, and that they did not preclude claims by entities of which the injured person was not a national where another basis justifying such a claim existed. On the first of these points the Court introduced the problem by stat- ing that the Charterinternational business litigation did not expressly confer upon the UN the capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him and that, therefore, an enquiry must first be made into whether the provisions of the Charter concerning the func- tions of the UN, and the part played by its agents in the performance of those functions, implied for the organization power to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in the bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage suffered in such cir- cumstances.34 The work of the UN necessitated the dispatch of impor- tant missions to be performed in disturbed parts of the world, involving for the members of the mission unusual dangers to which ordinary per- sons were not exposed.35 Further, the circumstances might also be such that a claim for any injury done to an agent of the organization in the performance of such a mission could not appropriately be brought by his national state or that the latter would not feel disposed to do so. Efficiency and independence of the staff required their protection.36 The Court’s conclusion was, therefore, that: Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Organiza- tion and of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear