contributions in such a case. In the case of (iii) there was probably no obligation to contribute, if a negative vote had been cast, because there was no question of preventing or

impeding the essential activities of the organization, in the event that dissenting member states did not contribute, and in practice, expenditures under such resolutions were financed by voluntary contributions.77 However, Judge Fitzmaurice did point out that the line between essential and non-essential activities was not always easy to draw. While the distinctions made by Judge Fitzmaurice relate to expenses incurred under non-binding resolutions, they are difficult to accept in toto. First, there is good reason to suppose that, where an expenditure is an expense of an organization, there is a strong presumption that all members must contribute to its defrayal. Second, the third class of expenditures which was singled out for different treatment is not materially or significantly different from those to which member states are under an obligation to contribute, because both kinds of expendi- tures flow from resolutions that theoreticallydispute resolution have the same legal effect, even if the practice of the UN has been to finance the third class of expenditures by voluntary contributions. Third, the basis of the distinc- tion made between that class of expenditures and other expenditures is rather tenuous, as Judge Fitzmaurice himself admits. On the other hand, one class of expenditures identified (the second) seems to be a dif- ferent kind of expenditure for the reason given that, if member states were under an obligation to contribute, the legal effect of the resolution would be greater than it de iure had. But the incidence of an obligationdispute resolution to contribute will depend not only on the absence of opposition by the member state concerned to the resolution but, in the event a mem- ber state does oppose the resolution, on other considerations as well 77 Ibid. 378 f i n a nc i ng connected with the obligations of member states flowing from such res- olutions as a result of their legal effect.78 Further, it must be recognized that the obligation to contribute will certainly arise not only in the case of decisions of the SC but also in the case of any resolution taken by the organization which legitimately has binding effect. The better view as qualified by some of what Judge Fitzmaurice had to say may be clear. It is significant dispute resolutionthat the sanction provided in Article 19 of the Charter, whereby the delinquent member loses its vote in the GA if it is two years in arrears, has, indeed, though perhaps reluctantly, been applied. The USA was not in favour of its application in the case of the Soviet Union and France. The USA itself has been careful not to be two years in arrears. To argue from the reluctance on the part of mem- bers to apply Article 19 that there is a legal right to withhold payment subject, no doubt, to the power of the other members of the organiza- tion to apply the Article 19 sanction is illogical and unwarranted. The fact that there is a sanction