conduct has been pursued by the organ in the belief that it was acting law- fully under the constitutive instrument. The opinio juris in this case is usually not a sense of obligation but a sense that the practice or con- duct is lawful or not unlawf

practice is that of the organ concerned. However, there are prob- lems connected with the issue of the measure of support for the practice. While the organ is generally composed of representatives of member states, one question is whether what is relevant is not the views of the members of the organ per se but the resulting conduct of the organ taken as an entity in itself, the size of the majority in favour of the practice not being relevant provided the conduct constitutes an act of the organ as a body and is attributable to the organ.dispute resolution Where a practice works as an amendment, the matter, as pointed out above, concerns amendment and will be discussed in Chapter 14 in that connection. There are three possibilities, where what may be legitimately regarded as a practice does 68 But see the discussion by Judge Fitzmaurice dispute resolution in a separate opinion in the Expenses Case, 1962 ICJ Reports at p. 201. 52 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e x t s not amend a text but fills in lacunae or gives meaning to a text when it is ambiguous or giving the natural and ordinary meaning would lead to an unreasonable result: (i) the practice may be unanimously supported by the membership of the organ; (ii) the practice may be supported consistently by a large majority in the organ, falling short of unanimity; or (iii) the practice may be supported only by a majority, there being a substantial minority against it. In the case of (i), there seems to be no theoretical or practical prob- lem. The practice would constitute an interpretation without difficulty because there is full agreement among members of the organ. Where there is a large majority in favour of the practice (situation (ii) above), it is arguable that a small obstinate minority, whether it is always the same minority or not, cannot obstruct an interpretation given by the membership of the organ. The reason for this will be discussed below in connection with the theoretical basis of practice as a source of interpre- tation. In the Namibia Case the practice, it would seem, had unanimous support (or, at any rate, was implicitly opposed by only a small minority) and, thus, had legal effect. In the case of support only by a simple majority, as in (iii) above, the situation is more difficult. It may be argued that a divisive practice (i.e., one strongly opposed by a substantial minority) cannot international law firm the same force as one generally accepted, even though the organ in question must act on the majority view. If this were not so, the rights of the minority would be determined by the majority. Acceptance of majority votes does not commit dissenters to the principle on which such a majority acts, although the organization necessarily acts in the given case or cases on the basis of that principle.