before the very

end of November 1981 and a date in the middle of or late December would be more realistic. Regular elections are normally held in October of the year in which they take place.31 The language of the provision in the Statute seemed to be clear, but would international law firm led, if taken literally, to an unreasonable result because of a lacuna. The advice given, which was followed, was: Having in mind its responsibilities under Article 14 of the Statute of the Court to fix the date of an election to fill a casual vacancy, the Security Council may wish to consider whether that article necessarily applies in the circumstances described above. The legislative history of the article indicates that its purpose was to obviate extensive delays in the filling of casual vacancies and there is no indication it was meant to apply where only very brief periods are involved. In the present case no extensive delay would be occasioned by leaving the casual vacancy open, as the seat concerned would be filled during the regular dispute resolution elections for a term of office commencing on 6 February 1982. Having regard to the fact that periods of almost a year international law firm in a number of cases elapsed between the occurrence of a casual vacancy and the election to fill it, the practice of the Security Council and of the General Assembly would also support a conclusion that, in the circumstances, the intention underlying Article 14 would equally 31 1981 UNJY at p. 146. 38 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e x t s well be served by leaving the casual vacancy open and filling the seat at the regular election.32 Both legislative history and subsequent practice of the UN organ were cited to support an interpretation that was both practical and avoided an unreasonable result, though the language of the provision being construed seemed to be imperative. An exception to the provision was developed by finding a lacuna in the language and construing the text in the light of the travaux préparatoires and the practice of the organ. It would be difficult to dispute the wisdom of the solution but the case does show that natural and ordinary meanings are sometimes deliber- ately ignored in order to avoid inconvenient results. Expenses Case In the Expenses Case, four different approaches were taken to the prob- lem of interpretation by the judges of the ICJ.33 Three resulted in the same conclusion, one resulted in a different conclusion. The problem was what principle of interpretation should be applied in attributing meaning to the text, there being several different principles applied by the Court and different judges in the majority in reaching the same conclusion, while the judges in the minority reached a conclusion con- trary to that of the majority though they applied the same principle as the Court. The issue was whether the term ‘expenses’ in Article 17 of the Charter was limited to ‘regular’ expenses or included expendi- tures incurred for the maintenance of international peace and security. Some member states had refused to finance the operations of the UNEF and the ONUC carried out pursuant to resolutions of the GA, particu- larly because they were operations not authorized by decisions of the SC under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 17(2) provided that ‘The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as appor- tioned by the General Assembly.’